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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

This conflict is perhaps irreconcilable; but both judiciaries are merely
seeking a just disposition of the appointive property which is at least
consistent with, if not in strict obedience to, the testator's intent.
Conclusion
A liberal trend in construing the execution of powers of appointment
by means of a residuary clause is noticeable, both in the jurisdictions
still adhering to the strict common law rule and in those which have
legislated this rule away.
Blending of the appointive property with that belonging to the
testator is still largely governed by the apparent intent. Blending merits
judicial approval for various reasons; for instance, because of the
similarity between a general power and fee simple ownership and because of the desirability of allowing the creditors of the testator to
reach this property to satisfy the testator's debts.
It is the prediction of the writer that, although blending will remain
important, the methods of manifesting an intent to exercise a power
discussed above will gradually fall into disuse. Few people, who have
been apprised of the importance of precise phrasing in order to take
advantage of the various deductions under the federal estate tax,51 will
rely upon a mere residuary clause to exercise a power of appointment.
But, since there will always be the exception, the testator who ignored
the warnings, the rules enunciated above will continue to have limited
application.
James F. O'Rieley

RECENT DECISIONS
REQUIREMENT OF PARTY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ELECTIONS LOYALTY OATH FOR NOMINATION IN PRIMARY ELECTION. Mairs v.

Peters, -. Fla..... , 52 So. (2d) 793 (1951). The plaintiff was a resident of Florida and a registered Republican there. She voted for candidates of both political parties in the 1948 general election and stated
that she intended to vote for candidates of both parties in the 1950
election. In 1950 the plaintiff sought nomination in the Republican primary but was refused eligibility by the Board of Elections, defendant,
because of her inability to execute the statutory requirement, FLA. STAT.
51 E.g., INT. REV. CODE § 812. For a discussion of the technical drafting problems arising out of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 58, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951), see Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951,
65 HARV. L. REX'. 55 (1951).
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c. 102 § 29 (1949), that all persons seeking nominations in the primaries
take an oath to the effect that: (1) he did not vote at the last general
election for any nominee, national, state or county, of any party other
than that party in which he aspires to be nominated; and (2) that he
pledges himself to vote for all nominees of such party, national, state
and county, at the next general election. She contested the constitutionality of the statute and contended that it is repugnant to the Constitution and deprives her of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
as implemented by the Civil Rights Act, Rv. STAT. § 1979 (1875);
8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946).
The court, quoting from the decision of the court below, stated that
the right of suffrage is not one of the necessary privileges of a citizen
and that it is within the police power of the state to regulate nominations by the adoption of a primary election law. The statute was held
to be a valid exercise of the police power enacted to restrain the destruction of political parties by those who utilized them "to advance their
political fortunes." 52 So. (2d) at 795.
The decision is of political significance in that it extends the legislative requirements which a person seeking office must satisfy in order
to exercise his elective franchise, possibly unduly restricting his right
to vote as he pleases and possibly excluding certain persons or groups
of persons from nomination. The essential question for consideration is
whether such a statutory requirement unreasonably or arbitrarily deprives a person of his privilege of franchise or. of his constitutional
rights as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although primaries are not elections in the strict sense, as are the
general elections, the courts have always realized their importance in
maintaining the valuable party system in our method of government.
Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987, 994-5 (1916). These statutory requirements stand in recognition of the theory that party unity is
necessary and that to secure party unity, oaths are necessary. "Otherwise the party holding the primary would be at the mercy of its
enemies, who could participate for the sole purpose of its destruction
...

."

State v. Michel, 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430, 435 (1908). Whether

they exist in statutes or arise from the permission given in statutes to a
state election board to impose them, oath requirements are generally
upheld as valid. Ex parte Pollard, 251 Ala. 309, 37 So. (2d) 178
(1948); Smith v. McQueen, 232 Ala. 90, 166 So. 788 (1936); Roberts
v. Cleveland, 48 N.M. 226, 149 P. (2d) 120 (1944); Riter v. Douglass,
32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1910); State v. Flaherty, 23 N.D. 313,
136 N.W. 76 (1912); State v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85
(1908).
In upholding the oaths the courts distinguish between privileges
given by a state and those given by the Federal Government. The
right to become a candidate, like the right to vote, flowg from state
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citizenship and the state may deprive a person of that right without
contravening the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution
unless there is shown an intentional or purposeful discrimination - with
respect to a particular person or class. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1,
64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497 (1944); McFarland v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498, 60 L. Ed. 899 (1916). Healey
v. Wipf, 22 S.D. 343, 117 N.W. 521, 522 (1908), clearly sets out the
principle on which the courts rely:
The elective franchise is not a natural right. It is a privilege which
may be taken away by the power which conferred it; and the only
limitations upon the power of the Legislature to regulate its exercise
and enjoyment are the express and implied limitations found in the
federal and state Constitutions.
It is then on the basis of the public concern for the integrity of the
elective system that these primary elections are regulated by direct
legislative enactments or by powers of control granted to an election
board. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281
(1939); Kenneweg v. Allegany County Com'rs, 102 Md. 119, 62 Atl.
249 (1905); Hopper v. Stack, 69 N.J.L. 562, 56 Atl. 1 (1903); In re
Callagan, 200 N.Y. 59, 93 N.E. 262 (1910); Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Ore.
167, 66 Pac. 714 (1901).
Although early decisions held that membership in political organizations was voluntary and that the parties were completely regulated by
their party by-laws and constitutions, People v. Democratic Committee,
164 N.Y. 335, 58 N.E. 124, 126 (1900), throughout the years there
has been a marked change in the attitude of the courts toward political
parties and their primaries. Today special interest must be taken in the
primaries because they may very well be as final as the general elections.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368
(1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed.
701 (1944); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 41 S. Ct. 469,
65 L. Ed. 913 (1921). In Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (4th Cir.
1947), invalidating a party regulation which excluded Negroes from
primaries, the court said, 165 F. (2d) at 389:
The party may, indeed, have been a mere private aggregation of in-

dividuals in the early days of the Republic, but with the passage of the
years, political parties have become in effect state institutions, governmental agencies through which the sovereign power is exercised by the
people.
An Indiana case, Kelso v. Cook, supra, 110 N.E. at 994, exemplifies
the reluctance of the courts to impose such a restrictive requirement
as is necessary in the interpretation of the Florida statute in regard
to party affiliation of nominees. There the court upheld a requirement
for an affidavit because it required only that the candidate show he
voted for a majority of the party candidates at the general election, and
not for all of them.
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In other states where party loyalty oaths exist, there also has been a
persistent refusal to go so far in interpretation as was necessary under
the instant statute. In State v. Schmahl, 140 Minn. 220, 167 N.W.
797 (1918), that the candidate had been elected on a different party
ticket in the last election was no basis for showing that he had been
"affiliated" with that party so as to disqualify him in a subsequent
election on another ticket. Texas has underscored this trend by passing
a statute forbidding the exclusion of persons from candidacy because
of former political affiliations. VERNON'S ANN. Tax. STAT. Art. 3107
(1948).
In some states where there are no statutory qualifications as to eligibility of persons for nomination in the primary, the courts have held
that there can be no additional requirements, other than those necessary to fit one for office, and that the test of party loyalty is the vote
of the people. Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659 (1898); State
v. State Board of Canvassers, 78 S.C. 451, 59 S.E. 145 (1907). Others
find restrictions imposed in the form of an oath violative of provisions
of the local state constitution. Harrington v. Vaughan, supra; Swindall
v. State Election Board, 168 Okla. 97, 32 P. (2d) 691 (1934). As
stated in the latter case, 32 P. (2d) at 693:
The effect of these provisions is to confer upon the individual voter
the right to vote as he pleases. He cannot be deprived of the exercise
of this privilege and right by a pledge previously taken.
In Dove v. Oglesby, 114 Okla. 144, 244 Pac. 798, 800 (1926), the

court stated that while the right to suffrage does not inhere in the mere
right to live and exist, yet it does inhere in the right of self-government
and the free exercise of such right is essential to the maintenance of
free government. Clearly expressed in these Oklahoma cases is the
proposition that a person cannot be deprived of his right to vote as he
pleases by a pledge previously taken. It is also held that such a pledge,
should it exist, is a mere statement of intent and binds only as a
moral obligation and that to hold otherwise would raise "grave doubts"
as to the validity of the statute. Westerman v. Mims, 111 Tex. 29, 227
S.W. 178, 180 (1921). Other courts, reasoning along similar lines, have
held that although an oath may be required, it in no way barred a
person from supporting another candidate, notwithstanding the fact
that he took an oath to the contrary. Graham v. Alliston, 180 Ky. 687,
203 S.W. 563, 565 (1918). When a nominee stated that he was going
to vote for the candidates of another party, he reserved to himself a
right and privilege which, under the constitution and laws of the state,
is guaranteed to him as an elector. Swindall v. State Election Board,
supra; State v. Michel, supra. These decisions differ markedly from the
instant case which holds that a person seeking nomination must surrender by oath his entire freedom of franchise. He must swear to vote
for an undetermined candidate who perhaps held political views con-
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trary to his in the past, and who has completely undetermined political
and economic views for the future.
Justice Cardozo, in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88, 52 S. Ct. 484,
76 L. Ed. 984 (1932), refuted the argument that political parties are
mere voluntary organizations and held them to be a type of "governmental instrument." His position was that because a Negro properly
could not be excluded from a governmental instrumentality, he could
not be barred from a political primary. And there is no more logic
in the exclusion of a person from participation in such a "governmental
instrument" because of his inability to be the unconditional adherent
of one political party than there is in his exclusion because of color.
In the opinion of the writer, a man should participate without restriction in the governmental instrument or agency which ultimately
determines the governing body to which he is subject. The degree of his
participation should vary principally because of his personal qualities
and secondarily because of his political affiliations. If restrictions there
must be, it would be better to exclude from office a person who
blindly follows a political party than one who exercises independent
judgment in voting for public officials.
Thomas D. Logan

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT AND STATE COURTS IN APPLYING THE EQUAL PRO-

54
5 So. (2d) 114 (1951).
TECTION CLAUSE. - Rice v. Arnold, .Fla .....
The relator, a Negro, brought an action in mandamus against the
respondent, a city official, who made certain rules regulating the use
of a golf course owned by the City of Miami. Under the rules, the
course was open exclusively to members of the white race on certain
days and exclusively to members of the colored race on other days.
The relator sought to compel the respondent to allow him the privilege
of using the facilities of the club at all hours and on all days that it
was open to the public. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial
of mandamus. The United States Supreme Court, 340 U.S. 848, 71 S.
Ct. 77, 95 L. Ed. 621 (1950), vacated the judgment against the
relator and remanded the case to be considered in the light of Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. 1114 (1950), and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851,
94 L. Ed. 1149 (1950). Both of these cases were decided after the
relator's appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.
The court in the instant case first considered the effect of an order
by the Supreme Court vacating its judgment. It recognized the paramount authority of that Court in construing the Constitution, March-
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man v. Marchman, 198 Ga. 739, 32 S.E. (2d) 790, 792 (1945); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 AtI. 640, 644 (1933); Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N.C. 145, 144 S.E. 701,
704 (1928), but reasoned that to vacate a judgment is not to reverse
it or to preclude an affirmation. The Supreme Court itself set forth its
power to vacate and outlined the effect of vacation in Patterson v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607, 55 S. Ct. 575, 79 L. Ed. 1082 (1935),
where it pointed out:
We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction
we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review
but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in
determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any
change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment
was entered. We may recognize such a change, which may affect the
result, by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the
state court may be free to act. We have said that to do this is not to
review, in any proper sense of the term, the decision of the state court...
but only to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment
and having a bearing upon the right disposition of the case.
This interpretation of the Supreme Court's appellate powers has been
reiterated in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555, 60 S.
Ct. 676, 84 L. Ed. 920 (1940); State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van
Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 515, 59 S. Ct. 605, 83 L. Ed. 950 (1939), and has
been embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (Supp. 1951). It has been held
that unless the Supreme Court reaches a contrary conclusion the state
court is not precluded from exercising its own judgment. Brown v.
Palmer Clay Products Co., 290 Mass. 108, 195 N.E. 122 (1935). Since
the Supreme Court rendered no opinion, but merely designated two
cases to be considered, it did not reach a contrary conclusion and the
Florida court was left free to exercise its own judgment.
The court then turned to a consideration of the referred decisions
and proceeded to distinguish the facts in each from those in the instant
case. In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the appellant, a Negro student, had
been denied entrance into the University of Texas Law School, but
had been offered the opportunity to enroll in another school provided
by the state. The Court held that this did not afford him equality of
educational opportunity because he was denied the valuable benefit of
commingling with the students of the University, the use of its facilities
and school prestige. The court in the instant case held that Sweatt was
not applicable since the facts before it presented no question of equal
facilities.
The McLaurin situation, supra, presented a less tangible denial of
equal rights. In essence the complainant was allowed all the facilities
afforded white students, but was required to sit in a designated section
when in the classroom, cafeteria or library. Here the Supreme Court
ruled that to deprive him of complete freedom to intermingle with his
fellow students was in effect to deny him a valuable source of his
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education, the interchange of thoughts with his fellow students. The
Florida court pointed out, once more, that the decision was based upon
a denial of an equal opportunity to learn, a "denial of equal facilities."
Having distinguished these cases from the instant case on the basis
of equal facilities, the court observed that in Sweatt v. Painter, the
Supreme Court declined to disturb the rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), one of the early
decisions used as a guide in substantiating "Jim Crow" laws which do
not affect interstate commerce. In considering the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that Court held, 16 S. Ct. at
1140:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things,
it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise
of their police power.

The relator, however, had not questioned the right of the state to
segregate the races in the use of public facilities. He relied solely upon
the ground that any allocation of certain times for the use of his race
was an unjust discrimination. This contention the court found to be
inconsistent with the police powers of the state to effect racial segregation. Plessy v. Ferguson, supra; Pattersonv. Taylor, 51 Fla. 275, 40
So. 493 (1906). Had the relator brought this action to secure more
hours during which he would be allowed the use of the course, and
had proved that the present hours were disproportionate, his action
probably would have met with greater success. His action was without
basis in that he sought relief which would necessarily overthrow the
right to segregate the races; yet he did not deny, and in fact recognized,
that right. The writ he was seeking would have required the respondent
to allow Negroes to use the course every day that it was open to the
public. Its net effect would thus have been to overrule a long line of
decisions supporting the "Jim Crow" laws.
Whether the Florida court correctly distinguished the relator's
appeal from the Sweatt and McLaurin decisions would seem to turn
upon that court's view of the nature of the game of golf. Here, dearly,
there were equal physical facilities offered to the relator. The crux
of the problem which might have brought this case within those decisions depends upon the value, to participants in the game of golf, of
commingling with the other patrons of the course. The Florida court,
in exercising its power of judicial notice, took the view that there was
no substantial benefit to a player resulting from association with other
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golfers who are not in his immediate foursome. Under this view the
instant case can be distinguished from the Sweatt and McLaurin factual
situations. However, even though no ruling is given by the Supreme
Court when it vacates a judgment under the rule announced in Patterson v. Alabama, supra, the Court here must have seen a similarity of
abuse in the relator's appeal. The value of social and business contacts
should not be denied or discounted as insignificant.
McLaurin, supra, harrowed the permissibility of segregation laws,
but it did not completely abolish their legality. There is yet much room
for distinguishing' cases, such as the instant one, from the rule set
forth in that case. Until a forceful decision appears overruling Plessy
v. Ferguson, supra, the laws stand and the states, as in this case, may
seek out distinctions to substantiate their decisions. While the "Jim
Crow" laws are allowed to remain unchallenged, the state courts are
free to condone the segregation of the races in the use of public
facilities.
Bernard James McGraw

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -

REQUIREMENT

OF A PERSONAL INTEREST IN EITHER THE PREMISES SEARCHED OR THE

United States v. Jeffers, .U.S ..... , 72 S. Ct. 93
96 L. Ed. *53 (1951). Jeffers was convicted of dealing in unstamped
narcotics. Several bottles of cocaine bearing no federal stamps were
admitted in evidence over his objection. These drugs had been stored by
Jeffers in his aunts' apartment without their knowledge. Though he did
not live with the aunts, he was given free access to their flat. While no
one was in the apartment, federal detectives entered by means of the
hotel manager's key and searched the premises thoroughly, eventually uncovering the contraband drugs. Upon conviction, Jeffers appealed to the' Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where
the judgment was reversed. Jeffers v. United States, 187 F. (2d) 498
(D.C. Cir. 1950). The Government then took the case to the United
States Supreme Court which affirmed the ruling of the circuit court.
Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, refused to engage shadowy distinctions between illegal searches of premises not belonging to the
defendant and illegal seizures of contrabandproperty, stating, 72 S. Ct.
at 95-6, that:
PROPERTY SEIZED. -

The search and seizure are, therefore, incapable of being untied. To hold
that this search and seizure were lawful as to the respondent would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was designed to
protect a fundamental right.

The Government had argued strenuously, both before the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court, that since Jeffers had no personal pos-
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sessory or proprietary interest in either the premises searched or the
contraband narcotics seized, his rights under the Fourth Amendment
were not violated. The dissenting judge in the circuit court agreed with
this contention, saying, Jeffers v. United States, supra at 510, that
"since primafacie these narcotics existed in violation of law, prima facie,
property rights did not exist in them." The Supreme Court summarily
dismissed this argument by ruling, 72 S. Ct. at 96, that the evidence,
because it was contraband, could not be returned to the defendant,
but that "It being his property, for the purposes of the exclusionary
rule, he was entitled on motion to have it suppressed as evidence on
his trial."
This difference of opinion entertained by the Supreme Court and
by a member of the circuit court points up the basic issue exemplified
by the cited case: whether personal interests, merely possessory or
actually proprietary, in the premises and/or in the evidence seized
must be shown in order to suppress it in the federal courts under the
search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment provides in part that "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " To secure
efficient protection under this Amendment the Supreme Court formulated the rule that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search
and seizure is inadmissible in a federal court. Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914). This rule of evidence
has since been recorded in FED. R. Cnri. P. 41 (e). Any hope that this
rule would be carried over into state law by the Fourteenth Amendment was removed by Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359,
93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949). The lower federal courts have developed the
"personal interest exception," Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 154 (1948),
an exception or limitation upon the application of the rule of exclusion.
It requires the defendant seeking to suppress the illegally obtained
evidence to show that he had a personal interest in either the premises
searched or the property seized. Casey v. United States, 191 F. (2d)
1, 3 (9th Cir. 1951); Grainger v. United States, 158 F. (2d) 236, 237
(4th Cir. 1946). For an analogous state rule see Delnegro v. State,
.... Md ..... 81 A. (2d) 241, 244 (1951). In the circuit courts of appeals
this exception has been quite strictly applied, so as to deny exclusion
of the seized evidence where the searched premises did not belong to
the person seeking the exclusion, Gibson v. United States, 149 F. (2d)
381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. O'Kelley v. United States, 326
U.S. 724, 66 S. Ct. 29, 90 L. Ed. 429 (1945); Ingram v. United States,
113 F. (2d) 966 (9th Cir. 1940). Exclusion has also been denied where
the searched premises belonged to a corporation of which the defendant
seeking exclusion was merely a stockholder, Lagow v. United States,
159 F. (2d) 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858, 67 S. Ct.
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1750, 91 L. Ed. 1865 (1947). But cf. United States v. Blok, 188 F.
(2d) 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). While this "personal interest exception"
has been popular in the federal circuit courts, it has not been applied
by the Supreme Court, Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 155 n. 48 (1948),
unless the instant case, which ostensibly rejects the exception, can be
deemed an "application" of it.
Of course, even under this exception as applied in the circuit courts,
a personal interest in both the premises searched and the property seized
is unnecessary, Gibson v. United States, supra at 384. Apparently a
personal interest in either one or the other is sufficient. To an ideal
point for examining the instant decision we thus proceed: did the
defendant have a sufficient personal interest in either the premises
searched or the evidence seized so as to qualify him under the circuit
courts' exception, or if this exception is unimportant in the Supreme
Court, what must a defendant show in order to suppress illegally obtained evidence. At least two opposing views in this regard are apparent
in the history of the cited case alone. One view, presented by the
dissenting judge in the circuit court, Jeffers v. United States, supra at
505-12, emphasizes the need for actual bona fide ownership interests in
either the premises searched or the property seized as a prerequisite
to Fourth Amendment protection. The second school represented by
the majority and concurring opinions in the circuit court, Jeffers v.
United States, supra at 499-505, espouses the view that mere defeasible
rights in the property seized are sufficient even without interests in the
premises searched. The Supreme Court opinion in the cited case is
actually a corollary of the second view differing only in that it finds
no merit in drawing distinctions between the elements of search and
the elements of seizure.
The dissenting judge in the circuit court pointed to an impressive
series of circuit court decisions which strengthen his position that bona
fide rights in the premises or property are indispensable. Jeffers v.
United States, supra at 506-7. He also found dicta of the Supreme
Court supporting him in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, 338 U.S. at 30-1;
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L. Ed.
1312 (1942); and in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35, 46
S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925). After establishing, to his own satisfaction at least, that the defendant Jeffers had no interest in the premises,
the dissenting judge argued that Jeffers also had no interest in the
contraband narcotics on which he could rely for suppression purposes.
This was true, he contended, because the unstamped narcotics were
instrumentalities of crime, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
64 n.6, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950), and subject to forfeiture.
38 STAT. 785 (1914), as amended, 44 STAT. 98 (1926), 26 U.S.C.
§ 2558(a) (1946).
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The second view, illustrated by the majority and concurring opinions
of the circuit court when the cited case was in that court, places great
emphasis upon the salutary purposes of the Amendment and regards any
strict limitation upon the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence as
destructive of those purposes. Under this theory either mere limited
rights of dominion over the premises or defeasible rights in the property
seized are enough to warrant suppression. A fine example of this view
is provided in United States v. Blok, supra at 1021, where the court
said:
The Fourth Amendment promises security against unreasonable
searches. We think a person who has enough interest in a place to make
a search unreasonable has enough to object to the search. Possession is a
complicated and artificial concept. It is often hard to say whether or not
a particular interest amounts to possession. We know of no reason why
standing to object to a search should turn upon that question.

In that case a search of a Government employee's desk located in a
federal building was unlawful since the employee had an exclusive
right to use the desk.
The Supreme Court in the instant case substantially agreed with this
second view but apparently went one step further when it eliminated
discussion of the search and the seizure as separate elements. The
basis for this position is difficult to ascertain for it aids naught in the
orderly analysis of the problem. To say that the search and seizure
are "incapable of being untied," 72 S. Ct. at 95, does not answer all
of the questions arising in cases where the person seeking the suppression of the seized evidence had absolutely no interest in the searched
premises, or where he had interests in the premises but none in the
property seized. If the rule still exists that an "objection to evidence
obtained in violation . . . of that [Fourth] Amendment may be raised

only by one who claims ownership in or right to possession of the
premises searched or the property seized," Gibson v. United States,
supra at 384, (Emphasis supplied), then the Supreme Court should
have presented discussion of each element, both the search and the
seizure as the rule in the Gibson case necessitates, or it should have
expressly rejected that rule. By doing neither the Supreme Court added
only confusion to this specific problem.
Robert A.' Stewart

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

TERRITORIES -

VALIDITY oF DISCRIMINA-

TORY TAX IMPOSED BY TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE ON NONRESIDENTS.

-Anderson v. Mullaney, 191 F. (2d) 123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted;
....U. S ..... , 72 S. Ct. 111, 96 L. Ed. *49 (1951). The Alaska Fishermen's Union, by Anderson, its secretary-treasurer, reiluested an injunction restraining the defendant, the Commissioner of Taxation for
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Alaska, from enforcing a tax on its members for participating in commercial fishing off the shores of Alaska. The tax complained of was
enacted by the territorial legislature of Alaska and placed a fee of $5
on residents and $50 on nonresidents for the right to fish. It was
shown that the nonresidents numbered approximately 3200 and came
generally from the west coast states, annually making the trip to
Alaska either as self-employers or as employees of large cannery
operators.
The complaint was dismissed in the district court on the ground
that the tax was not discriminatory, as alleged by the plaintiff, because
it was based on differences bearing a fair and reasonable relation to
the object of the legislation. 91 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D. Alaska 1950).
The lower court further held that the tax did not burden interstate
commerce in violation of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
On appeal the plaintiff contended that the tax violated the Commerce Clause because it favored residents over nonresidents in an enterprise having interstate ramifications. The circuit court approved the
plaintiff's contentions, and reversed the judgment of the district court.
The basis of the majority opinion was that a territory has no greater
power of taxation than it would have as a state.
One judge dissented and stated that the holding in the instant case
was in direct conflict with Haavik v. Alaska Packers Association, 263
U.S. 510, 44 S. Ct. 177, 68 L. Ed. 414 (1924), which, according to
the judge, held that a territory has the same power of taxation that
Congress possesses.
The issue presented is whether a territorial legislature has the power
to favor residents over nonresidents in an enterprise that has interstate
ramifications.
In Inter-Island Steam Nay. Co. v. Territory of Hawaii, 96 F. (2d)
412, 416-7 (9th Cir. 1938), the court mentioned that because commerce among states is a practical conception, it must be governed
by practical limitations and a territory must be considered as a state
in applying the Commerce Clause. Geographical problems presented
another practical aspect which was discussed in Stainback v. Mo Hock
Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 377, 69 S.Ct. 606, 93 L. Ed. 741 (1949),
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (Supp. 1951), where a statute designed to
protect state sovereignty was held not applicable to Hawaii. The
Court stated, 336 U.S. at 378-9, that where the intent of Congress
would be frustrated if the statute involved was not extended to include
territories, then territories would be included in the term "states," but
where the purpose of the act is not furthered, it will not be extended
to include territories.
The dissenting judge cited the Haavik case, supra, for the proposition
that a territory has the same power of taxation enjoyed by Congress.
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In the Haavik case, the Court upheld a tax discriminating against nonresidents, stating, 263 U.S. at 514: ".

.

. the Territorial Legislature

had authority under the terms of the Organic Act to impose both the
head and the license tax unless, for want of power, Congress itself
could not have laid them by direct action." However, in Auk Bay
Salmon Canning Co. v. United States, 300 Fed. 907, 909 (9th Cir.
1924), the view was propounded that the Haavik case is authority only
for the proposition that an annual poll tax and an annual license imposed on nonresident fishermen in Alaska are within the power delegated
to the Alaska legislature by the Organic Act.
It has been said that Congress may favor a territory, casting the
resulting burden on the states. Neuss, Hesslein & Co. v. Edwards, Collector of Internal Revenue, 30 F. (2d) 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1929). This
could be construed to allow Congress to aid the development of a
territory by favoring residents over nonresidents. However, that proposition is not authority for the view that a territorial legislature, a
mere instrumentality of Congress, may so discriminate against nonresidents. As far as Alaska is concerned, the Constitution and general
laws of the United States are applicable to it by express enactment of
Congress. 37 STAT. 512 (1912), 48 U.S.C. § 23 (1946). The territory
is further restricted by an Act of Congress prohibiting the territorial
legislature from legislating in certain fields as set forth in 37 STAT. 512
(1912), 48 U.S.C. § 24 (1946). As an aid in interpreting the above
statutes, reference may be made to Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
21 S. Ct. 770, 776, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901), where the Supreme Court
said:
...too much weight must not be given to general expressions . . . that
the power of Congress over territories is complete and supreme, because
these words may be interpreted as meaning only supremi under the
Constitution; nor . . . to general statements that the Constitution covers
the territories as well as the states, since in such cases it will be found
that acts of Congress had already extended the Constitution to such
territories....

To uphold the view entertained by the dissenting judge, it would be
necessary to hold that a territory has greater power to burden its intercourse with states than it would have as a state. The weakness of this
position is borne out by the many recent cases dealing with the territories. These decisions, while not necessarily identical with the cited
case, were concerned primarily with the validity of the territory's legislative acts as being either within its rightful area of legislation or as
contravening the general laws of the United States. In Freeman v.
Smith, 44 F. (2d) 703 (9th Cir. 1930), the court considered the
reasonableness of a license fee of $1.00 on residents of Alaska and
$250.00 on nonresidents and held that this difference was unreasonable
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and in conflict with an Act of Congress, 43 STAT. 464 (1924), 48 U.S.C.
§§ 221, 222 (1946), granting fishing rights to citizens of the United
States. And in Anderson v. Smith, 71 F. (2d) 493 (9th Cir. 1934), a
fee of $1.00 for residents and $25.00 for nonresidents was found to be
a reasonable interference with the statute above allowing fishing in
Alaskan waters, for the fee was not prohibitive. Martinsen v. Mullaney,
85 F. Supp. 76 (D. Alaska 1949), presented a similar problem, for the
court, in discussing the validity of a $50.00 tax on nonresidents and
$5.00 on residents, held the tax invalid, since there was no showing of
facts justifying the discrimination. In P. E. Harris & Co. v. Mullaney,
87 F. Supp. 248 (D. Alaska 1949), a tax by the territorial legislature
was deemed excessive and violative of a right granted by Congress.
The result of these cases is that a territory is strictly limited in its
power to legislate and thus does not have the same power of legislation
that Congress has. As pointed out by Shipman, Webster on the Territories, 9 YALE L. J. 185, 200 (1900):
. . . under the Constitution a Territory, when qualified for self-government, is entitled to the rights of Statehood, which, during the Territorial
condition, Congress holds in trust for the Territory, and exercises on its
behalf, surrendering them intact on admitting it as a State. A Territory
is constitutionally an infant State.

As a conclusion, the same author goes on to say, Shipman, supra at 205,
that a territory cannot have any greater rights than it would have as
a state. This view is further substantiated in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke
Lok Po, supra, 336 U.S. at 378, where it was said that in our form
of government the sovereignty of a state requires that greater weight
be given state legislation than that accorded the laws of a territory
over matters not ruled by the Constitution.
Certiorari has been granted in the instant case --- U.S ..... , 72 S. Ct.
111, 96 L. Ed. *49 (1951). The decision should prove enlightening
for the authority on both sides is rather meager. Other than the
Haavik case, based on facts similar to the principal decision, there
have been no other Supreme Court decisions discussing the power of
a territorial legislature to favor residents over nonresidents in an enterprise having interstate ramifications. Consequently, it is submitted
that the Supreme Court will of necessity distinguish the Haavik case,
as the circuit court did, or it will reject the interpretation of that case
as set forth by the dissenting judge.
Anthony V. Amodio
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 20 U.S.L.
WEas 4155 (U. S. March 3, 1952). [Editor's note.]
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CRIMINAL LAW -

JURISDICTION -

FEDERAL ANTI-KIDNAPPING ACT

AS A BAR TO STATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT FORCIBLY

COMPELLED TO ENTER THE STATE. - Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F. (2d)
464 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,-.--U.S ..... , 72 S. Ct. 112, 96 L. Ed. *49
(1951). The petitioner was arrested in Chicago, Illinois by two Michigan police officers who forcibly brought him into Michigan where he
was tried and convicted of a crime committed in that state. No extradition proceedings were instituted and petitioner did not sign a waiver
of extradition. The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-

trict of Michigan denied the petition for habeas corpus. This decision
was reversed by the court of appeals and cause was remanded.
The basic issue involved here was whether jurisdiction over the
person of one charged with a crime is impaired by the fact that he was
kidnapped and brought into the state by the arresting officers.
The general rule has always been that the personal presence of a
defendant before a court gives that court complete jurisdiction over
him regardless of the method by which his presence was secured, whether by kidnapping, Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 8 S. Ct. 1204, 32
L. Ed. 283 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30
L. Ed. 421 (1886), premature arrest, Malone v. United States, 67 F.
(2d) 339 (9th Cir. 1933), connivance, conspiracy and fraud on the part
of executive officers, Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111,
51 L. Ed. 148 (1906), trick or device, Ex parte Johnson, 167 U.S. 120,
17 S. Ct. 735, 42 L. Ed. 103 (1897), false arrest, Albrecht v. United
States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927), or extradition
for an entirely different crime than that upon which conviction was
based, Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 13 S. Ct. 687, 37 L. Ed.
549 (1893).
In the instant case, the court of appeals justified its departure from
the general rule laid down in Ker v. Illinois, supra, and Mahon v.
Justice, supra, relying upon the federal statute against kidnapping, 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (1946), and ruling that when state officers violate the
statute, the petitioner will be released on habeas corpus. The court
pointed out, 189 F. (2d) at 466, that the powerful, sweeping terms
of the Act did not specifically exclude state police officers and therefore
necessarily included them. The court then decided that if the Michigan
police had kidnapped the petitioner in violation of the statute as the
petitioner alleged, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court
would be a sanctification of a vicious act condemned by this policyladen enactment.
This line of reasoning is a complete deviation from other reported
federal cases on the point which have continued to follow the general
rule noted above even after the enactment of the Federal Kidnapping
Act. McMahan v. Hunter, 150 F. (2d) 498 (10th Cir.. 1945), cert.
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denied sub nom. McMahan v. Johnston, 326 U.S. 783, 66 S. Ct. 332,
90 L. Ed. 475 (1946); Sheehan v. Huff, 142 F. (2d) 81 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 764, 64 S. Ct. 1287, 88 L. Ed. 1591 (1944). The
petitioner in McMahan v. Hunter, supra, claimed he was a subject of
Canada and was kidnapped and brought within the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court. The circuit court affirmed the district court in holding that the manner in which jurisdiction over the petitioner was
acquired was not open to review on habeas corpus. That the generally
recognized validity of the prevailing rule often compels a court to
summarily dismiss arguments raised against it is clearly shown in
Sheehan v. Huff, supra at 81, where the court stated:
Counsel for petitioner, appointed by this court to represent him on
appeal, has filed a persuasive brief. It admits that the Supreme Court has
decided that jurisdiction in a criminal case is not impaired by the fact
that the accused was brought before the court in an unlawful manner,
but urges these decisions should not be followed. We believe, however,
that the question is so well settled that it cannot be reopened here.

State decisions favor the rule that jurisdiction cannot be questioned
on the ground that defendant's presence was secured by kidnapping.
People v. Dileo, 194 App. Div. 793, 186 N.Y. Supp. 156 (4th Dep't
1920); Commonwealth ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 166 Pa. Super. 413,
72 A. (2d) 150, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866, 71 S. Ct. 88, 95 L. Ed. 632
(1950). Kansas is the lone jurisdiction entertaining a contrary view.
In Kansas v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888), the defendants had been arrested in Nebraska by Kansas officers and forcibly
transported to Kansas. The Supreme Court of Kansas released the
defendants, ruling that Kansas courts should not sustain the service of
judicial process where the service was procured by a breach of the
peace committed by Kansas officers in a sister state or was obtained
in violation of some well-recognized rule of honesty or fair dealings
or by the ififraction of some law. The court further stated, 39 Kan.
at 264-5:
Such a service would not only be a special wrong against the individual
upon whom the service was made, but it would also be a general wrong
against society itself - a violation of those fundamental principles of
mutual trust and confidence which lie at the very foundation of all
organized society, and which are necessary in the very nature of things to
hold society together.

Although this decision has never been overruled in Kansas, its force
was lessened in Kansas v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052
(1918), which held that when the defendant was surrendered by the
authorities of another state under color of a federal statute which in
fact was not applicable, the trial court nevertheless had jurisdiction.
In the opinion, 170 Pac. at 1055, the court stated:
The jurisdiction of a district court to try a person on a charge of
having committed a public offense does not depend upon how he came
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to be in this state. There might, however, in a particular case be such
oppression and want of fair dealing in the matter as to justify a dismissal
of the case.

Nebraska until recently followed a rule similar to the Simmons case,
supra, being governed by In re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N.W. 267
(1890). There the defendant was released on habeas corpus after being
kidnapped from a neighboring state by Nebraska officers. But this
decision was expressly overruled in Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22
N.W. (2d) 124 (1946), where the court reiterated the rule that jurisdiction is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought
before the court.
Because the Supreme Court has not ruled on this precise point
since the passage of the Federal Kidnapping Act, its grant of certiorari
in the instant case, _..U.S ..... , 72 S. Ct. 112, 96 L. Ed. *49 (1951),
makes possible a clarification which should prove most interesting.
Although the arresting officers are criminally wrong, this wrong will
not be imputed to the sovereign. United States ex rel. Voigt v. Toombs,
67 F. (2d) 744 (5th Cir. 1933). Without question this abuse of legal
authority should be curbed, but the courts have not resorted to denying
jurisdiction as did the instant court of appeals. The prevailing opinion
has been that only the arresting officer is at fault and that adequate
protection can be obtained through the institution of proper proceedings
against him.
Frank A. Howard

DAMAGES -

APPEAL AND ERROR -

APPELLATE INQUIRY INTO EX-

CESSIVENESS. - Wetherbee v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 191 F. (2d)
302 (7th Cir. 1951). Wetherbee, plaintiff's decedent, received fatal injuries during switching operations while in the employ of defendant
railroad company. In a reverse movement he was rear brakeman
charged with the duty of keeping a "sharp lookout ahead." As he was
riding the stirrup of the rear car, it was derailed by a large block of
wood. The car veered toward the loading dock and crushed Wetherbee
before the brakes were applied. Plaintiff brought an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended,
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1946), and was awarded an $80,000 verdict.
The main issue presented on appeal was whether the circuit court
possessed the right to inquire into the excessiveness of the damages.
While admitting that the commonly-accepted rule bars inquiry into
mere excessiveness of damages, the appellate court granted a new trial
on the ground that there was, as a matter of law, some contributory
negligence for which no deduction in the amount of the damages was
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made, and that the jury had been misled by the figures of the actuary.
The actuary's figures, correct mathematically but erroneous as a
measure of damages, were almost identical to those of the jury.
The problem of inquiry into excessiveness of damages on appeal
involves the review of two discretions: the discretionary power of the
jury and of the trial judge. The discretion of the jury is predicated on
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII which precludes a re-examination of any fact
tried by a jury except in accordance with the rules of the common law.
The discretion of the trial judge is based on the premise that he, having
heard and observed the witnesses at the trial, is in the more favorable
position to judge the reasonableness of the damages and can insist on
a remittitur as an alternative to a new trial if he deems them unreasonable. Therefore, the appellate court cannot intervene unless the
jury have transcended their discretionary powers and the trial judge
has subsequently abused his discretion by allowing the verdict to stand.
Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F. (2d) 400 (4th Cir. 1948); Carter
Coal Co., v. Nelson, 91 F. (2d) 651 (4th Cir. 1937); Cobb v. Lepisto,
6 F. (2d) 128 (9th Cir. 1925); United Press Ass'ns v. National Newspapers Ass'n., 254 Fed. 284 (8th Cir. 1918); Jensen v. Denver & R. G.
R.R., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185 (1914).
In ordeK not to transgress the Seventh Amendment and FED. R. Civ.
P. 52 (a), a trial judge's exercise of discretion must be found to have
been abusive as a matter of law. A jury's assessment which is dearly
without support in the evidence and which has not been the subject
of the trial judge's remittitur is not an error of fact, but by its
exorbitance, an error of law, reviewable on appeal. Several decisions
have explicitly so held. VirginianRy. v. Armentrout, supra, 166 F. (2d)
at 408; Jennings v. McCowan, 215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E. (2d) 522, 532
(1949); Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. R., supra, 138 Pac. at 1192.
What constitutes an abuse of discretion? In the instant case the
abuse was indicated mathematically by the absence of any deduction for
contributory negligence, which was a compelling inference from the
evidence and by the extremely close correspondence between the deluding figures of the actuary and those of the jury.
It should be emphasized that, in the great number of cases, the
appellate courts wince at the thought of reversal for excessive damages
out of respect for the province of the jury and the prerogatives of the
trial court concerning the particular action. E.g., Bissonette v. National
Biscuit Co., 100 F. (2d) 1003 (2d Cir. 1939). A review of the dose
questions of excessiveness will be helpful here in analyzing the soundness
of the instant decision.
The problem is not intricate in the situations where the damages are
certain. An appellate court does not supplant the jury's discretion when
it modifies a verdict which is contrary to the undisputed evidence,
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Lannon v. Alex, 339 Ill. App. 645, 90 N.E. (2d) 800 (1950), or which
was made without regard to the charge of the court, United Press
Ass'ns v. National Newspapers Ass'n., supra, or where damages are
easily computable, Cobb v. Lepisto, supra. This certainly can be had
when the injury lends itself to a definite measure of damages, as in
most contract actions. E.g., Cobb v. Lepisto, supra, 6 F. (2d) at 129.
The perplexity arises with the uncertainty of damages. It is best
exemplified by death actions, as the case at bar, and personal injury
suits.
Although the often vague terminology in these cases tends to blend
them, there are essentially two tests applied by appellate courts in
reviewing excessive damages. The first is the "flagrantly excessive" test,
which controls the extreme case and suggests immoderateness by virtue
of the enormous amount alone. The second is the "unreasonably excessive" test, which usually controls the marginal case and which
requires closer scrutiny of the trial record. The latter test was used
in the instant case where the court was energetic in its search for error
in the record because of an indication of excessiveness.
Under the "flagrantly excessive" test, flagrancy actually becomes a
requirement which must be satisfied before the court will reverse for
excessive damages. The passion and prejudice of the jury must appear
at first blush; but, in the "unreasonably excessive" test, the basis
used is the insufficiency of the evidence, determined only by an exacting
search of the entire record. Thus, the courts using the "flagrantly excessive" test take cognizance of a narrower field of inquiry than do
courts using the "unreasonably excessive" test. It is a safe surmise that
a court applying the "flagrantly excessive" test would not have reversed
the trial court in the principal case because the error was apparent only
after a thorough search of the record. In line with the first test stands
Duffy v. Union Pac. R. R.. .... Utah._, 218 P. (2d) 1080, 1084 (1950),
which held that the verdict was exorbitant as to indicate passion and
prejudice. There, the verdict was five times greater than the stipulated
loss of wages, the only substantiated item of damages present. In
Billups Petroleum Co. v. Entrekin, 209 Miss. 302, 46 So. (2d) 781, 786
(1950), the court declared the $35,000 verdict in favor of a 23 year
old man for fracture of leg and pelvis excessive because it evinced
passion and prejudice. On the other hand, the courts in Southern Pac.
Co. v. Zehnle, 163 F. (2d) 453 (9th Cir. 1947), and De Toskey v.
Ruan Transport Corporation, 241 Iowa 45, 40 N.W. (2d) 4 (1949),
allowed the verdicts to stand because they were not so "flagrantly
excessive" as to raise the presumption of passion and prejudice.
In the second class of cases which present closer questions and use
the "unreasonably excessive" test, the courts are found to be more
analytical in that they examine the entire record before sustaining
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or overthrowing the jury's assessment. The rationale for the reversal
in these suits centers around the insufficiency of the evidence.
This is inversely shown in Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Tydal Co.,
157 F. (2d) 851, 852 (5th Cir. 1946), where the court recognized the
rule that there could be no reversal for error of fact, but said:
• . . it is our duty to scrutinize more closely the evidence and reconsider
our suggestions as to how the jury might reasonably have reached the
amount in the verdict they made. [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, where the verdict is found to be without a sound and sufficient
basis, the award is held to be "unreasonably excessive." In Buchanan
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 159 F. (2d) 576, 578 (7th Cir. 1947), the
court, citing the Home Ins. Co. case, stated that the trial judge alone
had the right to upset a verdict, but that "the reviewing court can,
if it thinks the verdict is not according to the weight of the evidence,
scan the trial more closely for error." This seems to convey the idea
that excessiveness damages must be parasitic to some other error
of law to warrant reversal. The Supreme Court in Union Pac. R. R. v.
Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 38 S. Ct. 318, 62 L. Ed. 751 (1918), refused to
reverse where the verdict appeared excessive and no deduction had
been made for contributory negligence. The verdict was not "unreasonably excessive" because there was a reasonable basis for the jury's
findings. This case was factually similar to the principal case. In
Ripley v. C. I. Whitten Transfer Co.. .... V. Va ..... , 63 S.E. (2d) 626,
628 (1951), the court held, in overturning the verdict, that mathematical precision and absolute certainty are not re4uired, but that the existence and quantum of damages must be reasonably certain.
When the courts using the test of "unreasonably excessive" arrive,
by means of an inference, at the conclusion that the verdict manifests
an error of law, they approach the outer perimeter of the permissible
bounds of appellate inquiry. The mathematical figure representing the
amount of the damages must clearly appear to be erroneous as a
matter of law. Southern Railway-CarolinaDivision v. Bennett, 233 U.S.
80, 34 S. Ct. 566, 58 L. Ed. 860 (1914); Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Vallery,
248 Fed. 483 (8th Cir. 1918); F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v.
Stamper, 306 Ky. 311, 207 S.W. (2d) 752 (1948).
The principal case approaches the sanctioned borders where an error
of fact ceases to be reviewable as an abuse of discretion. The court
can almost be heard .to say: Under the circumstances $85,000 is, as a
matter of fact, excessive. We cannot reverse or remit on appearances
alone; but where, as here, excessiveness is indicated, we can scan the
record more closely for errors of law. This the court did and found
that no deduction had been made for contributory negligence when,
as a matter of law, it was present.
Richard R. Murphy
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS -

DIVORCE

A

VINCULO -

WHETHER LIVING

UNDER SAM-E ROOF PRECLUDES SEPARATION FROm BED AND BOARD. -

Hawkins v. Hawkins, 191 F. (2d) 344 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The plaintiff
brought suit for divorce a vinculo from her husband, the defendant, in
the District Court for the District of Columbia. The facts of the case,
established by the plaintiff's undisputed, corroborated testimony, were
that the parties, though living in the same house, had no marital relations for twenty years prior to the suit. They did not visit friends or
go out together socially and had no common social life. There were
two daughters to the marriage, now grown and married. The whole
family sometimes, though not usually, ate together, but even on these
occasions the husband and wife did not speak to each other. The
plaintiff had based her action on D.C. CODE tit. 16, § 403 (1940):
A divorce from the bond of marriage or a legal separation from the
bed and board may be granted for adultery, desertion for two years,
voluntary separation from bed and board for five consecutive years
without cohabitation....

The district court denied the divorce. The court of appeals reversed
and granted the divorce holding that the required separation was present
even though the parties were living in the same house. This determination seems an unwarrantable interpretation of the statute and directly
conflicts with interpretations applied in other jurisdictions where similar statutes allow divorce on grounds of "separation."
The majority rule in the states which have similar statutes is to the
effect that a divorce will be denied where it appears that during the
period relied upon the parties have lived in the same house. See, 17 Am.
JUR., Divorce and Separation § 162 (1938). In McDaniel v. McDaniel,
292 Ky. 56, 165 S.W. (2d) 966, 967 (1942), the court in construing
the Kentucky statute, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 403, § 020 (Baldwin
1943), pointed out that "The accepted meaning of the term 'living
apart' is to live in a separate abode." This definition was accepted later
in Ratliff v. Ratliff, 312 Ky. 450, 227 S.W. (2d) 989 (1950), as the
law of the jurisdiction in denying a divorce based on the same grounds
where the parties had shared the same house.
In McNary v. McNary, 8 Wash. (2d) 250, 111 P. (2d) 760 (1941),
the husband failed to prove his allegation that the five-year period of
separation had been established. He urged that the divorce be granted
on proof that he had been denied his conjugal rights for more than
five years, but the court insisted on the strict "separation" set out
in the statute. The Washington court was again presented with this
question in Neff v. Neff, 30 Wash. (2d) 593, 192 P. (2d) 344 (1948),
where the parties lived in the same house, but both testified that there
had been no marital relations for several years. The divorce was refused
on the ground that the parties had failed to make out the requisite
"separation" since they occupied the same house, though the court
admitted there was little to be gained by keeping them yoked together.
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The Rhode Island court, in Stewart v. Stewart, 45 R. I. 375, 122
Ati. 778 (1923), stated that separate roofs were not essential for allowing divorce to parties who occupied separate apartments in a multiple
unit building. The reason why separate dwellings are so widely insisted
upon was well stated in Hava v. Chavigny, 147 La. 330, 84 So. 892
(1920), where the court stated that the "separation" referred to in the
statute is the separation which is manifest in the community in which
the spouses live and that the evidence is not to be sought "behind the
closed doors of the matrimonial domicile." This was the basis for the
denial of a divorce in Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E. (2d) 154,
157 (1945), and was accepted by the court in Dudley v. Dudley, supra.
The circuit court of appeals in the instant case did not look outside
its own jurisdiction for aid in resolving the question. As authority for
its determination that the phrase "separation for five consecutive years
from bed and board without cohabitation" does not require separate
domiciles, the court cited Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F. (2d) 229 (D.C. Cir.
1946), a case differing from the cited case only as to facts, in that in
Boyce, the parties never ate at the same table. The only substantiating
authority in Boyce v. Boyce, supra, is a footnote reference to Pederson
v. Pederson, 107 F. (2d) 227 (D.C. Cir. 1939). However, in Hurd v.
Hurd, 179 F. (2d) 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the instant court found authority for its position. There it is stated, 179 F. (2d) at 69:
. . . a wife seeking a divorce under the District of Columbia Code is not
required to live separate and apart from her husband further than so to
segregate herself from him as to avoid condoning acts which she charges
as the basis for divorce.
In the instant case the court indicated that it was attempting to
fulfill the purpose of the statute and cited Parks v. Parks, 116 F. (2d)
556 (D.C. Cir. 1940), as illustrative of a congressional intent to liberalize the divorce law in the District of Columbia and thus permit
termination in law of marriages which had ceased to exist in fact.
But in the Parks case the parties had completely separated for the
statutory period, the only question being whether a privately drawn
separation agreement signed by the parties during the running of the
statutory period could be said to vitiate the voluntary nature of the
separation. The holding was that the agreement so executed could not
constitute a reconciliation necessary to change the character of the
separation.
The courts are peculiarly silent about the legislative history of the
statute in these cases, especially so in this latest case which demands
an interpretation directly opposed to the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions having similar statutes.
The legislative history of the statute, D. C. CODE fit. 16, § 403
(1940), does not expressly or implicitly support the holding in this
case. The bill was prepared as a request to Congress to liberalize tht
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divorce laws of the District of Columbia which at the time allowed
divorce a vinculo on the grounds of adultery only. The bill so presented
did not suggest as one of the grounds for divorce a vinculo "separation"
of the parties, H. R. REP. No. 1532, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935).
The Senate Committee for the District of Columbia amended the
pertinent section of the bill by adding additional grounds for absolute
divorce, namely separation "for five consecutive years without cohabitation," SEN. REP. No. 720, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). The
House amended this phrase, H. R. REP,. No. 1532, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1935), as follows: "The '5 year separation' clause is amended by
inserting the word 'voluntary' and 'from bed and board for 5 consecutive years without cohabitation.'" The bill was discussed at length on
the floor of the House. In support of the House Committee's change of
the bill to read "voluntary" and "from bed and board for 5 consecutive
years without cohabitation," Mr. Palmisano, a Representative from
Maryland, and a member of the Committee, said, 79 CONG. REC. 11592
(1935):
We included voluntary separation and made it from bed and board in
order to be certain the parties would not be living under the same roof
and cohabitating. This is a provision that is more liberal than the
Maryland and Virginia statutes.

The bill was subsequently passed with the amendment as stated, 79
CONG. Rnc. 11597 (1935). The Senate concurred in the House Amendments and, without further incident, the bill became law. Thus the
legislative history of the statute in question shows that the intent
of Congress was that the statute should conform in meaning to the
generally accepted use of the words, "voluntary separation from bed
and board."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has in the past
considered legislative history when it has been in doubt as to statutory
interpretation. The writer of the opinion in the instant case clearly
pointed up the anomaly which is implicit in a disregard for legislative
history when he dissented in Beach v. United States, 144 F. (2d) 533,
538 (D.C. Cir. 1944):
I submit this dissent not in defense of the Mann Act but in defense
of the authority of Congress. Courts have often construed statutes in
novel and questionable ways, but they have not often read an entire
phrase completely out of a statute. They did not do so in any of the
cases which this court cites. No euphemism can obscure the fact that this
court does so when it imposes upon clear and simple words a construction
which allows them no effect. It thereby substitutes for a constitutional
and relatively democratic legislative process one that is neither democratic nor constitutional.

The Supreme Court added weight to this dissenting opinion by reversing the majority, United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 65 S. Ct. 602,
89 L. Ed. 865 (1945), and by holding that the plain meaning as evidenced by the legislative history should be given effect.
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In the present case the court's struggle to clear away the doubt it
found in the question is not only something less than objective, but
dearly against policies that it has formerly enunciated as guides in
interpreting the law when doubt exists.
Howard V. Burke

LABOR

LAW -

TAFT-HARTLEY ACT -

NoN-COMaMUNIST AFFIDAVITS

OF PARENT UNION OFFICERS AS JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES TO
RELIEF BY SUBSIDIARY UNIONS. - NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co.,

341 U.S. 322, 71 S. Ct. 758, 95 L. Ed. 969 (1951). Highland Park
Manufacturing Company refused to obey an order of the. National
Labor Relations Board requiring it to bargain with the Textile Workers
Union of America. The United States Court of Appeals, 184 F. (2d)
98 (4th Cir. 1950), denied the petition of the Board for enforcement
of its order and the Board brought certiorari. The Highland Park
Manufacturing Company contended that it was not required to bargain
with the Union because the officers of the CIO, of which the Textile
Workers Union was an affiliate, had not filed non-communist affidavits
as required by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(h) (Supp. 1951), though the officers of the Textile Workers
Union had done so. It was argued that because the failure of the officers
of the parent union to file the affidavits disabled the affiliate, the Board
should not entertain the complaint. The Supreme Court, with two
justices dissenting, held that the affiliate could not avail itself of the
facilities provided by the Act until the officers of the parent union had
filed the affidavits. The Court ruled the CIO was a "labor organization"
within the meaning of the statute.
The .non-communist affidavit required by the Act has been the subject of stormy controversy. Its constitutionality was upheld against
objections that it resulted in a denial of free speech, constituted an
ex post facto law and was in effect a bill of attainder. American Communications Assn., CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94
L. Ed. 925 (1950).
In Section 159(h) the Taft-Hartley Act provides that the Board
shall give no relief to a labor organization
. . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed .

.

. by

each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or
international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent
unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party....
The instant case raises the interesting question whether the CIO is
a "national or international labor organization" within the meaning of

the statute. Specifically, should non-compliance on the part of officers
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of the CIO, or the AFL, be imputed to labor unions which remain
practically autonomous though allied to one of these parent federations?
In Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 11 (1947),
the Board ruled that it could entertain the complaint even though the
national officers of the AFL had not filed the required affidavits. The
Board concluded that it was not the congressional intent to include
either AFL or CIO within the non-communist provision of the Act.
The rationale was that the constitution of the AFL and the CIO showed
them to be federations rather than labor organizations and that affiliates
of such federations were self-governing units subject to little direct
control. The Board further stated that if complying unions within the
federation were to be denied the benefits of the Board's machinery for
settling disputes merely because one officer of the AFL or CIO failed
to comply, then the complying unions would have no incentive to rid
themselves of Communists and employers would be unable to effect
peaceful settlements through the Board. In the opinion, 75 N.L.R.B.
at 16, it is stated: "Nothing ... could play more readily into the hands
of the dissension-seeking Communist leadership. We cannot believe that
Congress intended any such paradoxical result." The same conclusion
was reached in S. W. Evans & Son, 75 N.L.R.B. 811 (1948), and later
in American Fruit Growers, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 1157 (1948).
The decision in the instant case resolves the conflicting interpretations in the lower federal courts. In Oil"Workers International Union v.
Elliott, 73 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Tex. 1947), the court held that the
Board could not entertain the complaint of a union so long as the
parent organization had not filed the necessary affidavits. There the
court reasoned that constituent unions of the CIO influence and shape
CIO policy. If the affiliate is denied the right to avail itself of the
machinery of the Board because officers of the parent federation refuse
to file non-communist oaths, then the affiliate might seek to influence
a change in the policy of the parent. The same question was presented
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v.
Postex Cotton Mills, Inc., 181 F. (2d) 919 (5th Cir. 1950). There the
Board contended that the CIO was a federation having no direct control
over its affiliates. The court answered this by stating, 181 F. (2d) at
920:
We think the language of the statute, considered in the light of
Congressional purpose, the evil to be remedied, and the means provided
to effectuate that purpose, evidences Congressional intent to wholly eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each
and every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the
unconstitutional overthrow of our Government.

The court held the CIO to be a "national labor organization" within the
meaning of the Act.
However, in West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 184 F. (2d) 233
(D.C. Cir. 1950), the court held the AFL did not come within the provi-
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sions of Section 159(h). The court relied on a report by the joint
Committee on Labor-Management Relations wherein the committee
members analyzed and tacitly approved the holding of the Board in
Northern Virginia Broadcasters, supra, as being consistent with the
congressional intent. See SEN. REI'. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
11-2 (1948).
It would seem the Supreme Court decided the instant case in accord
with the congressional intent. Opponents of the provision pointed out in
congressional debate that by including officers of the parent federations
in the section requiring the non-communist affidavit, Congress was
making it possible for one recusant official to cause a break-down in
peaceful negotiating throughout the country. 93 CONG. REc. 6385,
7439 (1947). However, the provision was passed over these objections
and a sound conclusion is that Congress intended to include CIO and
AFL officials and to preclude any action by the Board concerning unions
affiliated with either until all officials had submitted the affidavit.
The purpose of Section 159(h) is to rid the labor unions of Communist influences. Oil Workers International Union v. Elliott, supra. It is
doubtful whether legislation alone can accomplish this purpose, but it is,
at least, a step in the right direction. When the Board refuses to give
redress to unions affiliated with the CIO or AFL, it is probable that
the affiliates will bring pressure to bear on the parent federations and
cause all officials to submit affidavits.
Robert D. Lightfoot

OIL AND GAS -

RIGHTS OF PARTIES AFTER SUBSURFACE SEVERANCE

OF MINEi AL ESTATE. - Carter Oil Co. v. McCasland, 190 F. (2d) 887
(10th Cir. 1951). Carter Oil Co., lessee of the mineral rights in certain

land in Oklahoma, assigned to McCasland its rights in the leases to all
producing horizons above 4000 feet. It reserved all its interests in the
horizons below that depth. A producing horizon was encountered by
McCasland slightly above 4000 feet; later, the same sand was encountered by Carter at 4300 feet. Although it was unknown to the parties

at the time of the assignment, the formation was an unorthodox one;
instead of being comparatively level, it was slanting, dipping at al
angle of from 58 to 60 degrees. McCasland sued for a declaratory
judgment to determine both parties' rights under the assignment. The
trial court made findings of fact concerning the formation and determined that an active water drive in the structure would continue,
permitting all the recoverable oil to be extracted through McCasland's
wells. Carter claimed a right to drill and produce oil from this formation
where it is encountered at a depth of more than 4000 feet. McCasland
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claimed a similar right. The decision in the lower court in favor of
McCasland was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
The circuit court based its decision on the construction of the instrument and held that Carter intended to grant to McCasland the exclusive right to drill into all producing horizons encountered above
4000 feet and the exclusive right to remove all recoverable oil and gas.
The majority affirmed the trial court's finding that the term "producing horizon" means the point at which a reservoir is encountered
and from which the oil and gas may be recovered. Since the assignment
conveyed the right to all producing horizons above 4000 feet, and
since that term means, according to the court, the point of encounter,
it concluded that the entire horizon was conveyed. This construction
of the instrument is open to questions which were well answered by the
dissenting judge. He doubted the definition of a producing horizon
adopted by the trial court and defined it as a producing oil or gas
sand. More telling was the assertion that the words of grant and the
words of reservation were the same, since it indicates that Carter intended the 4000 foot level to be definite and inflexible. Using the same
construction of the assignment applied by the majority, the dissenting
judge maintained that Carter reserved the exclusive right to drill and
produce all the recoverable oil encountered in producing horizons below
4000 feet. The conclusion of the dissent was that each party had a
right in the producing sand, the rights being separated at 4000 feet.
Undoubtedly, the rights in oil and gas may be severed at some depth
below the surface, Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. ....Okla.
.... 231 P. (2d) 997, 1012 (1951), as may interests in other precious
minerals. 2 SNYDER, MINES § 998 (1902). The court in the instant case
made no attempt to follow general rules of mining law, although the
decision has some slight similarity to decisions reached under the "extralateral rights" rule. By that rule the owners of land containing the apex
of a mining claim may follow the vein under the surface, although it
extends outside the vertical sidelines of the surface location. REv. STAT.
§ 2322 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1946); Grant v. Pilgrim, 95 F. (2d)
562, 565 (9th Cir. 1938). If this were applied to oil and gas claims,
it would seem to give effect to a rule of discovery, which is not the
law in Oklahoma. Instead, the rule of capture is applied, Gruger et ux.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 192 Okla. 259, 135 P. (2d) 485 (1943),
except where it has been modified or abrogated in particular instances
by the state. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77
P. (2d) 83 (1938); H. F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Bond, 173 Okla. 348,
48 P. (2d) 820 (1935).
Under the Oklahoma Unitization Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 286.
(Cum. Supp. 1949), oil and gas can be extracted from a common
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source of supply as though the source were covered by a single lease.
This Act was enacted to achieve the greatest possible recovery of oil
and gas and it recognized that as a practical matter, the rule of capture
often results in economic waste. Under the wording of the Act, it could
not be applied in the instant case, but the court, without expressly
stating it, possibly arrived at its decision for reasons of conservation.
It mentioned the fact that maximum production of recoverable oil
and gas could be made through the wells of McCasland.
The formation of the producing horizon in the instant case, as found
by the trial court, consisted of a gas cap at the top, oil below, some
gas in solution, and considerable water below the oil. It would have as
sources of natural energy, solution-gas expansion, gas-cap expansion
and water drive. It has been estimated that recovery of oil in place
from water-drive reservoirs, under ideal reservoir conditions, might be
as high as 85%, although the usual estimate is from 40 to 70%. OIL
AND GAS PRODUCTION 46-7 (Engineering Committee, Interstate Oil
Compact Commission 1951). See also CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS
12 (Murphy ed. 1949) (60-70%); FANNING, OUR OIL RESOURCES 12630 (2d ed. 1950). If the rule of capture had been applied in this case,
Carter would be allowed to drill offset wells into the producing sand
at depths below 4000 feet. Even though production would be restricted
by the state, OIcLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Cum. Supp. 1949), the ultimate recovery of oil would be diminished. It was estimated in a similar
structure where offset wells were drilled, again under favorable reservoir
conditions, that recovery would be from 20 to 30%. OIL AND GAS
PRODUCTION, supra at 49.
It is quite possible that Carter would soon be producing only water
from its offset wells and much of the oil in place might be coned-off
or by-passed. Predictions are, of course, hazardous and the ultimate
percentage of oil recovered from the formation would depend on many
factors, but unquestionably, maximum utilization of the water-drive
energy would be best effected by restricted production and advantageous location of wells. It is doubted that this would be possible if Carter
also produced from the horizon. Its wells would necessarily be placed
between McCasland's wells and the water, and possibly the water would
encroach only to these wells, rather than move all the way up the
structure. However, this could be prevented by limiting the production
from the Carter wells and capping them at the proper time.
The court did not question the right to sever interests in minerals
at depths below the surface. Recognizing that, it apparently found a
boundary line at 4000 feet dividing the interests of the parties similar to
a boundary line on the surface. In that light the decision is difficult to
understand. It perhaps was reached on the cumulative effect of the
following considerations. Since Oklahoma is a non-ownership state,
Melton et ux. v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P. (2d) 509 (1940), the
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grant conveyed an exclusive right to drill and produce. McCasland
was to drill a test well. The horizon was unknown to the parties at
the time of the assignment, but the discovery of some horizon could
have been anticipated and provided for by the assignor. The instrument
should be construed most strongly against the party who drafted it. 4
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 978 (3d ed. 1939). This last point should
be qualified because leases of oil and gas interests are construed to
promote production and prevent delay. Superior Oil & Gas Co. v. Mehlin, 25 Okla. 809, 108 Pac. 545 (1910). They are construed, then,
against the lessee who is to conduct development. This is still the view
of the Oklahoma courts, Anderson v. Talley, 199 Okla. 491, 187 P. (2d)
206 (1947), although the reasons for it are no longer thought to be
applicable. Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas, 18 MIcH. L. REv. 652,
666-7 (1920). The aggregate of these considerations might be said to
place the equities on the side of McCasland. These, and the everpresent, most important policy of conservation, are probably the real
bases of the decision.
A severance of a producing horizon by a surface boundary has
created little difficulty. Each party has an exclusive right to drill
and produce from wells on his own tract. The oil or gas becomes the
property of the parties as they reduce it to possession. Since a producing horizon may be severed horizontally in the earth as well as
vertically by a surface division of land, in strict justice the same rules
should apply in both cases. The court in the instant case is holding
that the assignor conveyed his interest in oil and gas at all depths above
and below 4000 feet if the oil or gas is first encountered above 4000
feet. Principally, the controversy arises because of the holding that
"producing horizon" refers to the point of encounter of oil or gas sand.
This could be avoided by phrasing the assignment so as to convey all
rights to oil and gas below a certain depth.
Robert A. Layden

SURETYSHIP -

COMPENSATED SURETY -

LIABILITY ON BOND.

-

Morley v. McGuire, ....Ark ..... 242 S.W. (2d) 112 (1951). McGuire, a
partner in Ark-La-Tex Cigarette Service, was appointed stamp deputy
by the plaintiff, Commissioner of Revenues of the state of Arkansas,
to handle the required cigarette tax stamps used in the partnership
business. Pursuant to the provisions of ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 2314
(Supp. 1951), McGuire executed and posted a bond with the plaintiff.
The defendant, National Surety Company of New York, was surety
on the bond. Under the terms of the bond defendant agreed to pay
the state the amount of any loss of taxes occasioned by any "fraudulent, neglectful, or dishonest act" of the deputy. Shortly thereafter
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McGuire had a disagrement with his partner, Nielson, over business
losses and the latter threatened to initiate default on McGuire's bond
in order to "cover up" a part of the loss. The deputy notified the defendant of Nielson's plan and his lawyer notified the State Revenue Department. He then locked the doors of the business in order to preserve
the records for an examination. However, a few days later, Nielson
broke the lock on the doors of the business and took possession. The
sole issue presented in the case was whether the surety was liable
on the bond in question for the loss sustained by the state. The court,
with one judge dissenting, considered McGuire negligent in locking the
doors of the business and abandoning it to a hostile partner, and held
the surety liable, on the principle that the bond of the surety company,
like any other insurance policy, was to be construed most strongly
against the "insurer."
The decision emphasizes the disparity in treatment" accorded the
compensated surety from that which prevails in favor of the voluntary or
accommodation surety-the rult of strictissimijuris..The case is a classic
example of the extent to which a court will go in stretching the liability
of a compensated surety.
Under the Law Merchant, an individual "voluntary" or "accommodation" surety was regarded as a favorite of the law. See Loyd, The
Surety, 66 U. OF PA. L. REv. 40 (1917). This surety did not prepare
the contract and often did not even read it. Rarely did he understand
its full scope and legal significance. Under these circumstances, courts
felt constrained to apply the doctrine of strictissimi juris, State v.
Churchill, 48 Ark. 426, 3 S.W. 352 (1887), entitling the surety to
invoke the most tenuous technicalities in order to secure release from
the contract. Crane v. Buckley, 203 U.S'. 441, 27 S. Ct. 56, 51 L. Ed.
260 (1906).
An inspection of the decisions involving the compensated sureties
will disclose a judicial approach of an entirely different character. See
Arnold, The Compensated Surety, 26 COL. L. REv. 171, 172-82 (1926).
The courts have reasoned that since the surety companies write their
own contracts, insert their own provisions, charge a premium and make
a profit, the contract should be construed most strongly against the
surety. National Surety Co. v. Rochester Bridge Co., 83 Ind. App. 195,
146 N.E. 415 (1925); Bryant v. American Bonding Co., 77 Ohio St.
90, 82 N.E. 960 (1907). In making this change, many courts have
swung so far the other way that they have created a rule of strictissimi
Juris in favor of the obligee to the prejudice of the surety.
In distinguishing the two types of sureties, courts have expressed
themselves in varying language. See STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURTY-

SHIP § 5.1 n. 4, 5, 6 (5th ed., Elder, 1951). Often the decisions state
simply that the corporate compensated surety is not entitled to the
benefit of the rule of strictissimi juris. Feutz v. Massachusetts Bonding
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& Ins. Co., 85 F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D. Mo. 1949); Wilmington
Housing Authority v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 43 Del. 381,
47 A. (2d) 524, 525 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Fiumara v. American Surety
Co. of New York, 346 Pa. 584, 31 A. (2d) 283,,287 (1943). Other
courts have said that the contract will be construed strictly against
- 235 P. (2d) 1, 3 (1951)
the surety, Myers v. Alta Const. Co. .... Cal .....
(statutory rule of construction); Barry Finance Co. v. Lanier, 79 Ga.
App. 344, 53 S.E. (2d) 694, 696 (1949); Bessinger v. National Surety
Corp., 207 S.C. 365, 35 S.E. (2d) 658, 660 (1945). Many judges have
declared that the contract is essentially a contract of insurance and
have applied the rule that such contracts are to be construed most
strongly against the insurer. Jack v. Craighead Rice Milling Co., 167
F. (2d) 96, 100 (8th Cir.), cert. denied nub nom. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Craighead Milling Co., 334 U.S. 829, 68 S. Ct. 1340,
92 L. Ed. 1756 (1948); Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau v.
National Surety Corp., 54 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Minn. 1944); Town
of City of Peoria v. Rauschkolb, 333 Ill. App. 411, 78 N.E. (2d) 123,

124 (1948).
On the other hand, many tribunals have presented the view that a
contract of suretyship is governed by rules of interpretation applicable
to other contracts in general. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Houser,
101 Cal. App. (2d) 480, 225 P. (2d) 539, 543 (1950) (statutory rule);
Galesburg Sanitary Dist. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 308 Ill.
App. 457, 32 N.E. (2d) 407, 409 (1941); Lange v. Board of Education
of Cecil County, 183 Md. 255, 37 A. (2d) 317, 320 (1944); John
McShain, Inc. v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 180 Md. 202, 23 A. (2d) 669,
670 (1942); General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.

(2d) 238, 241 (1949); See

RESTATEMENT, SECURITY

§ 90, comment a

(1941).
The liability of the corporate surety .is often based upon the element
of compensation, Community Bldg. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 8 F.
(2d) 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1925); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Eagle River
Union Free High School, 188 Wis. 520, 205 N.W. 926 (1925), and
also on the business motive of this surety. United States v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 117 F. (2d) 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1941);
Atlantic Trust & Deposit Co. v. Town of Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 690, 695
(4th Cir. 1908). The presence or absence of a premium, however, should
not be the determining influence on the court or jury. In Bench Canal
Drainage Dist. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 278 Fed. 67, 80 (8th Cir.
1921), the court said:
The enforcement of the express terms of the contract of suretyship
cannot be made to depend upon whether the surety is compensated or
not. It cannot be one contract when the surety is compensated, and
another contract when the surety is not compensated.

Nevertheless, the majority of authorities, with the exception of Texas,
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knox, 144 Tex. 296, 184 S.W. (2d) 612
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(1944), does not place the contract of a gratuitous surety and that of
the compensated surety on the same footing.
There is merit in the contention that the principles of construction
should be determined with reference to the draftsman of the contract.
Therefore, some courts have held that the strict construction against
the surety company does not apply when the wording is not that of
the company, but is taken from some other source for which the assured
rather than the company is responsible. Rose v. Ramm, 254 Mich. 259,
237 N.W. 60 (1931) ; Sturgis NationalBank v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
252 Mich. 426, 233 N.W. 367 (1930).
Perhaps the most common legislative and judicial analogy for
determining the liability of the compensated surety is that of insurance,
as was used in the present case. See VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 23-5 (2d ed.
1930). In Tebbets v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee-Co. of New York,
73 Fed. 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1896), one of the earlier federal opinions
interpreting the contract of a corporate surety, this language was used:
Corporations entering into contracts like the one at bar may call
themselves "guarantee" or "surety" companies, but their business is in all
essential particulars that of insurers, who, upon careful calculation of the"
risks of such business, and with such restrictions of their liability as may
seem to them sufficient to make it safe, undertake to assure persons against
loss, in return for premiums sufficiently high to make such business
commercially profitable. Their contracts are, in fact, policies of insurance,'
and should be treated as such.
The efficacy of this analogy has been questioned on the ground
that it is merely the application of the general rule that ambiguous
language in a contract is construed most strongly against the party
employing the language. See Weichelt, The Contract of the Corporate
Surety and its Distinction from One of Insurance, 9 Cm-KENT REv.
69, 75 (1931). However, it must be remembered that unless there is an
ambiguity, there is no reason for construction for or against either
party. As the court said in Lesher v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 239 Ill. 502, 88 N.E. 208, 210 (1909): "Here, however, there
is no ambiguity. . . .No room is left for construction." And as the
Supreme Court emphasized in Guarantee Co. of North America v.
Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 183 U.S. 402, 22 S. Ct. 124,
131, 46 L. Ed. 253 (1902): "But this rule cannot be availed of to
refine away terms of a contract expressed with sufficient clearness
to convey the plain meaning of the parties .... " Nor is the liability of
a corporate surety to be extended beyond the terms of the contract.
State ex rel. Lawson v. Warren Bros. Roads Co., 115 Ind. App. 452,
59 N.E. (2d) 912, 916 (1945); Art Plate Glass & Mirror Corp. v.
, 69 A. (2d) 808, 810 (Ct. of
Md .....
Fidelity Construction Corp., ....
App. 1949).
Yet, under guise of construction, courts, as in the present case, have
gone to extraordinary lengths to hold the compensated surety liable
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on its bond. As pointed out in the dissent to the instant case, 242 S.W.
(2d) at 115, "The question of construing the bond against the interest
of the bonding company has no place in the opinion as there is no
question about what the bond means - the only question involved is
that of carelessness." For a proper adjudication of the immediate case,
the only question which had to be decided was a simple question of
fact, whether or not the principal debtor was "neglectful." In the
opinion of the writer, the law promulgated by the court was not germane
to the issue involved.
Contrary to this case, there appears to be a return to the idea that,
while not entitled to the rule of strictissimijuris, the compensated surety
will not be subjected to a greater liability than the ordinary promisor
who draws a contract. Lange v. Board of Education of Cecil County,
supra; See STEARNS, supra, § 5.1. The corporate surety is an institution
that is of inestimable benefit to modern business transactions. Its
contracts should, like other contracts, be construed according to their
terms.
James J. Haranzo

TAXATION

-

FEDERAL INCOME TAXES -

BONA

FIDE

RESIDENCE IN

REQUIRED FOR EXCLUSION OF INCOME EARNED
Jones v. Kyle, 190
OUTSIDE UNITED STATES BY AMERICAN CITIZEN. FOREIGN COUNTRY

F. (2d) 353 (10th Cir. 1951). Appellee Kyle went to Saudi Arabia in
December, 1944, to work as a pipe fitter in the construction of an oil
refinery there. His plans were to stay there for eighteen months but it
was understood that he could, if he so desired, remain for a longer time
with his employer or other companies in the area. Kyle returned to the
United States in May, 1946, and purchased a farm in Oklahoma. A tax
return he filed for the year 1945 included income received from the
work performed abroad. At a later date he filed a claim for refund of the
taxes on the 1945 income and pursued this claim to the federal district
court where a judgment was entered in his favor, Kyle v. Jones, 92 F.
Supp. 600 (W. D. Okla. 1950). From this judgment the Collector of
Internal Revenue appealed. With Chief Judge Phillips dissenting, the
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for dismissal.
The taxpayer based his claim for refund on Section 116 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code which, during the taxable period involved,
provided that income earned by an individual from sources without
the United States shall be excluded from gross income when the
individual establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that he was a bona fide resident of a foreign country during
the entire taxable year. No exclusion was allowed for income earned
while in the employ of the United States or its agencies.
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To implement this statute the Commissioner promulgated U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.116-1 (1942), and adopted as a general test
of the residence requirement the rules followed in determining the
taxable status of resident aliens. Residence, it is declared, is a mixed
question of law and fact, and intention is considered to be of primary
importance. A mere indefinite intention or an intention ultimately to
return to his native land may not cloak an alien with immunity from
taxation as a resident, though if he be truly a transient, for instance, if
he is in the United States for a short time on a limited undertaking, he
may escape taxation. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.211-2, 29.211-3,
29.211-41 29.211-5 (1942). By analogy, therefore, an American citizen
abroad without a definite intention to remain away, but having a mere
floating intention indefinite as to time of return (though intending
ultimately to return), could not, before October 20, 1951, escape
taxation of income earned from sources outside of the United States.
Section 116 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code was amended by
Pub. L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (a) (Oct. 20, 1951), so as
to exempt income of a citizen of the United States which he earned
while living 17 out of 18 consecutive months in a foreign country,
whether he was a bona fide resident of the foreign country or not and
whether or not he intended to stay longer than the 18 months. Thus,
this statute changes the law announced in the instant case for if the
appellee had spent his 18 months in Arabia after October 20, 1951, his
income earned there would be exempt. But, under the new law, if the
stay is for less than 18 months, the old rule requiring proof of bona
fide residence in the foreign country in order to win exemption still
obtains. And for this reason, the following discussion of the rules
governing bona fide foreign residence is appropriate.
The generally accepted reason for exclusion from taxation of income
earned from non-Government sources by an American citizen abroad
is to stimulate foreign trade and commerce. Price v. United States, 87
F. Supp. 901, 903 (N. D. Ill. 1949). After the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the first act to
make specific provision for income of non-resident citizens was the
Revenue Act of 1926, § 213 (b) (14), 44 STAT. 26 (1926). Under this
Act, income earned outside of the United States was excluded so long
as the individual citizen was a bona fide non-resident of the United
States for more than six months during the taxable year. The requirement of bona fide non-residence was retained until the Revenue Act
of 1942, § 148 (a), 56 STAT. 841 (1942), which changed the residence
requirement to bona fide residence in a foreign country for the entire
taxable year.
Litigation which arises generally revolves about a question of the
nature and duration of the residence along with any other factors that
may reveal the taxpayer's intention. On the basis of the doctrine that
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exemptions from taxability are matters of legislative grace, the statutes
usually are strictly construed in favor of the Government. Helvering v.
Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U. S. 46, 49, 61 S. Ct. 109,
85 L. Ed. 29 (1940). Thus, with respect to workers living abroad whose
activities were associated with, or even incidental to, the war effort,
one court said that they were practically, except for geography, on
American soil even though in a foreign country and under a limited
consent of a foreign power. Downs v. Commissioner, 166 F. (2d) 504,
509 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 832, 68 S. Ct. 1346, 92 L. Ed.
1759 (1948).
It is difficult to formulate a clear-cut rule as to the test to be applied
to establish the right to exclusion. The district court in the cited case
noted that "residence" and "domicile" are slippery terms. It is
generally conceded in the cases that residence means living in a particular locality, that is, a mere bodily presence in a certain place, while
domicile means living in a locality with intention to make it a fixed
and permanent home. In re Newcomb's Estate, 192 N. Y. 238, 84 N. E.
950, 954 (1908). "Intention" makes the difference, and along with the
element of permanence, it is made a factor in the determination of
bona fide residence, albeit not an exclusive one. For this reason decisions
have required more than mere physical presence in a foreign country,
which was the basis found sufficient in the original hearing of the
cited case.
In the "war workers" cases, consideration is given to whether the
individuals live in temporary quarters, such as barracks furnished by
the employer, whether they are subject to limitation on movement
by the military or the company, as well as to their intention to return
ultimately to the States. Carl H. Thorsell, 13 T. C. 909 (1949);
William B. Cruise, 12 T. C. 1059 (1949); Dudley A. Chapin, 9 T. "C.
142 (1947); Ralph Love, 8 T. C. 400 (1947); Michael Downs, 7 T. C.
1053 (1946), aff'd, Downs v. Commissioner, supra; Arthur J. H. Johnson, 7 T. C. 1040 (1946). On the other hand, when confronted with
the geophysicists participating in a world-wide search for oil, whose
residence was where they hung their hat, the mode of living faded
in significance and "continuous and unbroken living there for four years
was 'residence.'" Swenson v. Thomas, 164 F. (2d) 783, 784 (5th Cir.
1947), reversing 68 F. Supp. 390 (N. D. Tex. 1946). To the same
effect is Audio Gray Harvey, 10 T. C. 183 (1948). That the "war
workers" often did not engage in the life of the community in which
they lived was raised against them, but that the exploring engineers
did not partake in community life and that they were forbidden by
employment contracts to engage in local politics received little attention.
That the citizen abroad may pay taxes to the country in which he
resided was a factor in the taxpayer's favor in the Swenson and Harvey
cases, supra, but that he did not was not controlling against him in
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White v. Hofferbert, 88 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1950); David E. Rose,
16 T. C. 30 (1951). Nor does the fact that his wife remained in the
United States bar a finding in his favor, Seeley v. Commissioner, 186
F. (2d) 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1950), reversing in part and affirming in part,
14T. C. 175 (1950). The cases involving foreign service careerists are found far easier
to deal with since exemption of their income, earned from sources
without the United States, can be justified as falling within the general
purpose of the statute offering inducements to foreign trade and commerce. In these cases the individual often works for an overseas branch
of an American company, pursuing his employment in one or several
different countries with a more or less indefinite intention of remaining
in foreign employment for a lengthy period. Often he establishes and
maintains a home for his family abroad, although the fact that he does
not, whether due to war-time restrictions on travel, illness, or other
causes, is not necessarily controlling, White v. Hofferbert, supra, David
E. Rose, supra; but that the taxpayer did move his family abroad is
given consideration in his favor, Myers v. Commissioner, 180 F. (2d)
969, 970 (4th Cir. 1950). Under pre-1943 law when the requirement
was for bona fide non-residence in the United States, the location of
the taxpayer's family carried weight in the determination of the right
to exclusion, Commissioner v. Fiske's Estate, 128 F. (2d) 487 (7th Cir.
1942), Commissioner v. Swent et ux., 155 F. (2d) 513 (4th Cir. 1946).
Nor do vacations or business trips back to the States cut the individual
off from the statutory exemption, for the legislative history of the various acts, as brought out in some of the decisions, embraced consideration of both vacations and business trips, Myers v. Commissioner,
supra; White v. Hofferbert, supra, David E. Rose, supra.
There has been no comprehensive congressional action to clarify the
nebulous status of the bona fide residence requirement. And only recently has Congress followed the suggestion by President Truman in his tax
message of January 1950, [1950] U. S. C. Cong. Serv. 1349, 1354, that
the foreign residence requirement for exemption of income earned
abroad be liberalized in an effort to support financial and technical
assistance to under-developed regions of the world.
The citizen about to engage in foreign service should consciously
plan his actions with a view to the tax consequences. One author has
outlined six recommendations to be followed by the individual: (1)
execution of a contract with the employer consistent with an intention
to become a resident of the foreign country; (2) declarations required
for visas and passports to show an intention to remain away as long
as consistent with the contract, with an intention to become a resident
of the foreign country; (3) establishment of a "home" abroad, and
participation in community life; (4) moving his family abroad; (5)
compliance with local laws, particularly the local tax laws, and; (6)
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non-withholding by the employer of taxes from the employee's wages
earned abroad and no payment of estimated taxes on such salary.
Halstead, Tax Planning for Americans Working in Foreign Lands, 28
TAxEs 861 (1950).
In any case it is clear that the grasp of the tax gatherer is ubiquitous
as well as certain, and like death, it may reach around the world to
exact his toll.
John M. Sullivan, C. P. A.

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE TAL INJURIES. - Woods v.

RIGHT OF CHILD TO RECOVER FOR PRENA-

Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. (2d) 691

(1951). Plaintiff, an infant suing through his guardian ad litem,
alleged that while he was in his mother's womb in the ninth month
of her pregnancy, he suffered, by reason of the defendant's negligence,
injuries that caused him to be born permanently disabled. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action and the New York Supreme Court affirmed. 278 App.
Div. 913, 105 N. Y. S. (2d) 417 (1st Dep't 1951). The Court of
Appeals reversed and held the action maintainable, overruling Drobner
v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921), which denied that
there could be an action in the name of a child to redress injuries
incurred while viable in the womb. The instant court stated, 102 N. E.
(2d) at 694, that it was bringing its case law on the subject into
harmony with modern scientific knowledge and that a court acts in
the finest common law tradition when it alters "decisional law to
produce common-sense justice."
The troublesome issue illustrated by the instant case is whether a
viable fetus has such a legal existence as will give rise to an action
in tort for injuries inflicted negligently.
Until recently an overwhelming majority of cases in both England
and in the United States denied the right of a child to sue for an injury
incurred prior to birth. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56
N. E. 638 (1900); Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E.
(2d) 446 (1939); Walker v. Great Northern Railroad of Ireland, 28
L. R. Ir. 69 (1890). The same rule has been applied in actions for
wrongful death or under survival statutes. Stanford v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Bliss v. Passanesi,
326 Mass. 461, 95 N. E. (2d) 206 (1950); Newman v. Detroit, 281
Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937); Buel et ux. v. United Rys. of St.
Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.,
....Neb ..... , 50 N. W. (2d) 229 (1951); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling
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Co. v. Jordan et ux., 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944 (1935). These
courts justified their decisions by arguing that the unborn child was
a part of the mother when the injury occurred and that any damage
to it, if recoverable at all, should be recovered by the mother. This was
a principal reason relied upon by Justice Holmes in the leading case of
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). In that case the
child was nonviable, yet many American courts have cited it as a
precedent for denying relief in actions similar to the cited case. Other
arguments used by these courts were that proximate cause would be
extremely difficult to prove and that courts would face a burdensome
task in dealing with fraudulent claims.
Within the past two decades several states have allowed recovery for
prenatal injuries to the viable fetus. The California court, in Scott v.
McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678, 682 (1939), allowed a recovery by upholding the California Code, CAL. Civ. CODE § 29
(1949), which includes, as a person, one yet unborn. The Ohio Supreme
Court, in Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114,
87 N. E. (2d) 334 (1949), held that a viable child is a person within
its state constitution and entitled to all the rights guaranteed thereunder. The child, when born, was allowed a cause of action against
a party committing an injury to'it while viable in its mother's womb.
To deny recovery would "deprive the infant of the right conferred by
the Constitution.'. . ." 87 N. E. (2d) at 340.
In a recent Minnesota case, Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,
38 N. W. (2d) 838 (1949), it was held that a cause of action was
maintainable by the personal representative of an unborn child if the
child was capable of a separate and independent existence at the time
of injury. In. Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga.
201, 65 S. E. (2d) 909 (1951), the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld
the right of an infant to sue for prenatal injuries even in the absence
of a statute authorizing the action. The court stated, 65 S. E. (2d) at
912:
We are content to say that for the reasons set forth in this opinion
we are satisfied that, without any legislative action, courts of Georgia have
the authority now, based upon the common law, to grant such relief....
A federal court, in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C.
1946), discussed the majority view which refused to allow such causes
of action, but adopted the minority view. The court applied the same
test - viability - which the minority courts use in determining
whether a cause of action will lie for damages to a child en ventre sa
mere, stating, 65 F. Supp. at 141:
It has, if viable, its own bodily form and members, manifests all of
the anatomical characteristics of individuality, possesses its own circulatory,
vascular and excretory systems and is capable now of being ushered into
the visible world.
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The law in New York prior to the principal case is well illustrated
by Drobner v. Peters, supra, wherein Justice Pound stated, 133 N. E.
at 568:
* . . I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that plaintiff has a cause
of action at common law. The injuries were, when inflicted, injuries to
the mother. No liability can arise therefrom except out of a duty disregarded, and defendant owed no duty of care to the unborn child in the
present case apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother.
However, in the instant case the Court of Appeals of New York
agreed with the modern trend. The court discussed the law of the
jurisdiction and the legal thought that had developed in the intervening
thirty years since Drobner v. Peters, supra. The court noted the trend
of the decisions permitting recovery in cases of this type, pointing out
that a lack of precedents no longer existed. 102 N. E. (2d) at 694.
Behind this immediate decision stands a question of conflicting legal
philosophies. The question involved is whether the cause of action for
prenatal injuries should be created by judicial decisions rather than by
legislative action. An able dissent in the case under discussion noted,
102 N. E. (2d) at 695, that the legislature could devise statutes denoting the stage at which a fetus is viable, setting time limitations for
bringing the action and providing adequate preventive measures
against fraudulent claims far better fhan could the court in deciding
a single case before it. The majority adhered to the judicial prerogative
of advancing the common law where necessary to conform to the needs
of justice. Judge Desmond, author of the majority opinion, refuted the
argument for legislative action advanced by the dissenting justice when
he stated, 102 N. E. (2d) at 694, that "we abdicate our own function,
in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old
and unsatisfactory court-made rule." This view was reiterated in
Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra, where the court cited POUND, THE SPIRIT
OF THE COMI ON LAW 181 (1921), quoting, 65 F. Supp. at 142:
Anglo-American law is fortunate indeed in entering upon a new period
of growth with a well-established doctrine of lawmaking by judicial
decision.

Daily v. Parker, 152 F. (2d) 174 (7th Cir. 1945), exemplifies the view
that courts can create new causes of action, without the aid of a statute,
when the justice of the case so demands. In that case the court permitted a recovery by minor children against a woman who had enticed
their father away. Admitting lack of precedents for the action the
court said, 152 F. (2d) at 177:
They [the judiciary] are ever looking for precedents, as they should be.

If none be found, however, they may not give up, - lost in darkness.
The situation is not hopeless. In a society as complex as ours, rare is the
situation where precedents cannot be found. And even in the common law,
in 1945, if no precedents be found, courts can hardly be advisedly called
radical if they indulge in lawmaking by decisions, or in a word, engage in
judicial empiricism.

